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People working in the field of systems engi-
neering have differing views as to the range
and depth of this subject. Without venturing
into the controversial arena of specific defini-
tions, I will assert that systems engineering
has much to do with the definition, evalua-
tion and control of the technical effort aimed
at achieving the objectives of a program.
Efforts in the field of systems engineering
may in fact go well beyond purely technical
considerations, e.g., when cost or political
considerations impact the technical ap-
proach to a program. In this context, the
systems engineering process must function
to maximize the probability that a program's
technical requirements can be met while at
the same time recognizing and including
other program factors and constraints. New
constraints as well as technical problems can
be encountered at all stages of a program,
often necessitating some adjustment to the
program objectives and requirements. Such
activities are part of the systems engineer-
ing process, which must begin immediately
at the start of a program and continue
throughout the life of the program.
Sometimes a program manager will con-
centrate on insuring that hardware elements
perform well and all play well together,
assuming that this alone will enable the
program requirements to be met. Then on
entering the operational phase, while the
system may indeed perform, it may not do
what was intended. This situation frequent-
ly occurs because many engineers, scientists,
managers, and yes, even administrators tend
to be intrigued by and want to concentrate
on configuration selection and design prob-
lems. It is the responsibility of the top-level
systems engineering professionals to be the
conscience of all participants in making sure
that program requirements are met or prop-
erly adjusted.
The need is to focus on program require-
ments during all phases and facets of a
program, e.g. definition, development, man-
ufacturing, testing, operations, growth and,
most important, effective use or mission
accomplishment. The effort just described in-
volves the entire systems engineering task;
however, the main emphasis of this paper is
the interaction of the systems engineering
process with the top-level program require-
ments. This aspect of systems engineering is
often given inadequate attention during
certain phases of a program. This paper will
endeavor to answer such questions as:
What is meant by top-level program re-
quirements, and who generates them?
How are these requirements validated,
altered, and controlled by the systems engi-
neering process?
What capabilities are needed to accom-
plish such efforts effectively?
WHAT ARE TOP-LEVEL PROGRAM
REQUIREMENTS?
Top-level program requirements are directly
related to program objectives or systems uses
determined and stated early during the
program definition. Probably the most re-
membered program objective of the past was
to "land men on the moon and return them
safely to Earth." The program requirements
that emerged from early studies included,
among others, one to two-week mission dura-
tions, lunar landing, extravehicular activi-
ties, launch from a remote site, rendezvous,
and reentry from near escape velocity, all of
which had never been accomplished at the
time of President Kennedy's statement.
These requirements in turn highlighted
the need to define and validate specific
technical approaches--redundancy concepts,
simple system interfaces, new technology
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requirements (e.g., fuel cells), operational
demonstrations such as Gemini, entirely
new configurations such as the LM, and the
nature of the flight program buildup. Inci-
dentally, many of the program requirements
for Apollo determined the mission objectives
for the earlier Gemini program. In any
event, program requirements must be estab-
lished early and stated distinctly so that all
necessary steps for meeting and validating
them can be determined. This effort is a fun-
damental systems engineering function.
Types of Program Objectives and
Requirements
The program objectives and requirements
described in the preceding paragraphs em-
phasize mission demonstrations. Obtaining
desired science or applications information is
another type of program objective. The pro-
gram requirements then state the need for
specific data, usually specifying a particular
instrument or instrument set; the operating
conditions under which the data is to be ob-
tained (e.g., orbit altitude, field of view, and
pointing accuracy); and the data handling
and use. Conversely, a new instrument may
be conceived or created with the program ob-
jective to establish its use potential. The
Multispectral Scanner employed in the
Landsat program is an example.
Another space program category includes
service functions such as Earth-to-orbit
transportation or a space laboratory. In the
first case, the program objective might be
economical and an easy access to the space
environment for the using community. Pro-
gram requirements then include such pa-
rameters as dollars per pound to orbit,
launch frequency and payload integration
lead times. Conversely, in this case, the
program objectives might also be stated in
terms of capability demonstrations such as
the reentry of a winged spacecraft, ground
landing and reusability. The program
requirements then are related to system
performance in accomplishing these mission
and configuration demonstrations.
It is important to firmly establish which
of the above two categories reflect the real
program objectives because a capability
demonstration has a higher potential for suc-
cess than a tightly specified use commit-
ment. The systems engineering organization
should be providing top-level program man-
agement with the information to make such
determinations. The program objectives may
vary during program implementation be-
cause of early "selling" pressures or because
of unforeseen technical problems When this
happens, the systems engineering organiza-
tion should provide concrete evidence to
management so that a strategy can be devel-
oped to properly inform the outside world,
e.g., Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), Congressional committees and the
media; if the outside elements are not made
to understand and accept such changes in a
timely way, support can be alienated,
placing extreme pressure on the program.
Establishing Priorities
When a large number of objectives and asso-
ciated requirements are included in a given
program, an additional complication occurs.
Several past programs qualify including pro-
grams as early as Gemini and space station
programs such as Skylab. Even Apollo, with
its simply stated mission objective, had
many secondary objectives associated with
lunar exploration and lunar science. It is
very important to establish priorities with-
out precluding the accomplishment of objec-
tives of lower priority. For example, the two
top priorities in the Gemini program were
demonstration of long duration flight and
rendezvous, but large quick-opening hatches
were incorporated to accommodate extrave-
hicular activities (EVA) and the spacecraft
structure was designed to permit the firing
of a large propulsive stage once docked to it.
Most of these secondary objectives were
106
THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ROLE IN TOP-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS
accomplished. In fact, because of the way the
actual flight program developed, EVA was
one of the first accomplishments. The secon-
dary program objectives also afforded some
flexibility; the paraglider system planned for
use in ground landing, for example, was
dropped from Gemini in order to meet cost
and schedule objectives.
To summarize what has been stated thus
far, a number of classes of top-level program
requirements exist. They can be associated
with mission objectives, scientific investiga-
tions or space services, among others. In
addition, different ways of looking at top-
level program requirements include demon-
strations as compared with tightly specified
commitments. Many programs have multi-
ple requirements. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to 'zero in' on these requirements early
in the systems engineering process, i.e.,
during Phase A. Most important, they must
combine to realistically meet the stated
objectives of the program; they must be
prioritized when necessary; and they must
be clearly stated and documented in the
Program Requirements Document.
These requirements may have to be
changed, adjusted or reprioritized as the
program proceeds, and any changes must be
carefully controlled and formally approved
at the top level of the program throughout its
life. If program objectives are affected, a
decision by the administrator is required (at
least for medium-to-large programs). The
outside world needs to be kept abreast of
significant changes in objectives or top-level
requirements so that no sudden surprises
occur that affect support.
The systems engineering function should
provide the initial evaluation and validation
of the top-level program requirements and
should continue to evaluate proposals or
events that would produce any change. The
effort should occur at the top level of a dis-
tributed systems engineering function and
guide upper level program management and
the administrator.
WHO GENERATES TOP-LEVEL PROGRAM
REQUIREMENTS?
A program objective can be conceived and
stated initially by almost anyone working at
any level, from the President, as in Apollo, to
others on down. If considered seriously, such
an objective is studied to determine its valid-
ity, practicality and usefulness. Sometimes
it takes a short time to obtain a go-ahead;
sometimes it takes many years, as on the
Space Station. One of the fallouts of these
efforts should be a clear statement of top-
level program requirements.
The involvement of the right people in
the generation of top-level program require-
ments is extremely important. Depending on
the nature of the program, this involvement
can include customers, users, operators and,
of course, designers and developers. Program
managers and directors, however, should
guard against limiting involvement in this
activity to just the latter two. Systems engi-
neering, should be involved early to assure a
reasoned and logical approach to the genera-
tion and iteration of program requirements.
In the space science and applications
arenas, program requirements are frequent-
ly generated by a process that begins with a
program objective or a flight system capabil-
ity being stated in an "Announcement of
Flight Opportunity." Investigators are then
selected through evaluation of the responses
obtained. The experiments selected deter-
mine the actual requirements of the flight
program. Other inputs are often required, as
adjustments may be needed in consideration
of technical limitations or program costs, for
example. The analysis and resulting output
of the systems engineering group usually
gives rise to an iteration of the program
requirements, which again involves the sci-
ence team. Frequently, a selected proposal
provides for excellent science but does not
deal adequately with other constraining
technical considerations and the cost impli-
cations associated with the overall effort.
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Hierarchical Consideration in
Requirements Generation
In all classes of space flight programs, the
systems engineering organization should
work closely with groups having expertise in
and cognizance over program requirements.
In Apollo, because the primary program
objective was oriented to the accomplish-
ment of a specific mission demonstration,
operational personnelmparticularly those
involved in flight operations--tended to be
near the top of the program requirements
hierarchy. Even though science re-
quirements existed and science teams and
advisory committees were active, the science
requirements were of lower priority, at least
until after the first lunar landing was accom-
plished. In contrast, a program such as
Skylab always included the solar scientists
and Earth resources investigators, among
others, at the top of the requirements hierar-
chy, even though the engineering and
operations personnel may have been
somewhat confused by this arrangement.
The Space Shuttle involves still another
situation. The operations groups can be per-
ceived to be the customers for the system,
but the real users at the top of the hierarchy
are the scientists, commercial firms, indus-
trial experimenters and NASA engineers
who provide the payloads that fly on the
Space Shuttle or conduct related experi-
ments or other use functions. This is similar
to the relationship between passengers and
shippers, the airlines, and the commercial
airplane developer in the air transport
industry. In addition to general operating ef-
ficiency, consideration must be given to user
accommodation from the start. Such needs
are now quite successfully accomplished in
commercial aviation. Naturally, expecta-
tions are less in the case of the Space Shuttle
because of its experimental nature, but it is
fair to say that user accommodation has not
been accomplished to the degree desired.
The foregoing discussion is not meant to
imply that successful hardware design,
development and systems integration is not
an important facet of systems engineering.
There are instances where these consider-
ations are at the top of the requirements
hierarchy. An instrument demonstration
such as the Multispectral Scanner is one case
in point, and the Advanced Communications
Technology Satellite (ACTS) is another tech-
nology demonstration of this type. In most
respects, the research airplanes such as the
X-1 and X-15 fit into this category. However,
this case does not fit the situations occurring
in most NASA programs. It is therefore criti-
cal for top-level program management to
examine its program, determine who the
main contributors or generators of the pro-
gram requirements are, and assure that they
are interfacing adequately with the systems
engineering function. This need exists at the
outset of the program but should continue
through the design and development phases,
for as hardware and software systems prob-
lems are encountered, the tendency is to
focus on them, and top-level program re-
quirements can be altered or even disappear
without due consideration.
WHO VALIDATES TOP-LEVEL PROGRAM
REQUIREMENTS?
Activities that validate top-level program
requirements are mostly of a systems en-
gineering nature. This validation, is an
important, though small, part of the total
systems engineering job. In total, systems
engineering, particularly during design and
development, is a distributed activity. Space-
craft hardware systems such as electrical
power, attitude control and communications
all have to be systems engineered. Total
systems elements (e.g., a launch vehicle
stage, a checkout facility, a launch complex
and a flight control center) all have to be sys-
tems engineered to correctly perform their
functions. In the end, all elements involved
in a program--the total flight system, the
operational support facilities, the mission
planning, and the user integration, among
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others--need to be brought together in a
timely fashion to meet the program objec-
tives and requirements. An effort of this na-
ture, even for a very modest program, is too
complex to be handled in a purely top-down
fashion. The cardinal rule is that all the in-
terfaces at any particular level, both hori-
zontally and vertically, should be as clean
and simple as is practical.
Validation Efforts During Program
Definition
At the start of program evolution, practically
all of the mainstream effort is of a systems
engineering character and is more top-down
than later in the program. The validation
effort begins in pre-Phase A, where options
are examined for meeting the program objec-
tives as well as certain initially stated pro-
gram requirements. These requirements
should endeavor to incorporate most of the
major program factors but are usually gener-
al and often are quite optimistic. All aspects
of the technical and programmatic approach
should be studied. Although effort is limited
in this phase, a determined attempt must be
made to establish and to ascertain the feasi-
bility of meeting the program requirements.
This work should usually be accomplished by
a team working at a single location,
although supporting effort and information
can be obtained from groups in other loca-
tions. There have been cases where alterna-
tive approaches are studied by separate
teams, which has proved to be effective in
some pre-Phase A efforts. In all likelihood,
the program requirements will be changed
and expanded to account for such factors as
technology readiness, knowledge of the
operating environment, mission complexity
and similar factors. A need for additional
technology development or operational
verifications may be identified as well. Any
pre-Phase A study that is completed with
everything looking rosy should be viewed
with caution.
Phase A efforts are aimed at selecting
and analyzing a single programmatic and
technical approach, at least in theory, to best
meet the requirements of the program.
Again, the Phase A activity is chiefly a sys-
tems engineering effort usually conducted by
a single team at a single location. If a work
breakdown structure with clear interfaces
can be established at this time, then systems
engineering at multiple locations may be
possible. In any case, the group that worked
during the pre-Phase A study needs to be
augmented considerably, and the support of
one or more contractors is frequently
obtained.
In this phase, emphasis should be placed
not only on hardware but on validating the
mission design and other operational or use
aspects of the program. This emphasis is par-
ticularly important where the operational
life of the program is envisioned to be very
long, e.g., Space Shuttle, Hubble Telescope,
Space Station and the Earth Observing
System (EOS). It is important to clearly
establish what is required in the operational
phase and to establish with adequate confi-
dence the feasibility of accomplishing the
programs with realistic operational costs
and schedules.
At the time the program enters Phase B,
a complete work breakdown structure should
be established, including all facets of the pro-
gram with simple and clear interfaces and as
little overlap as possible. Program work
assignments will be made. For moderate to
large programs, these assignments may
involve program groups at different geo-
graphic locations, including parts of the total
systems engineering effort. The top-level
program requirements should have been
established in adequate detail, and each
program organizational element should
regard these requirements as program con-
straints.
The program requirements or even the
objectives can be changed because of unfore-
seen events or other activities occurring
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throughout the course of the program, but
they should be subject to formal change
control. Obviously this particular change
control activity deals with top-level program
requirements and must occur at the highest
level in the program; in certain cases, the
administrator should be informed of an
impending change and must be informed
when program objectives are significantly
impacted.
Validation Efforts During Design,
Development and Operations
Although the top-level systems engineering
effort in the definition phases of a program is
important, this function is critically impor-
tant in Phases C/D, the design and develop-
ment phases. It is during this time that most
of the technical difficulties and other pro-
gram limitations surface. There is a strong
tendency to focus on the flight hardware and
to get it delivered and flying. These situa-
tions sometimes allow the top-level require-
ments to "fall through the cracks," later
producing surprises, embarrassments and
undue pressures, which can contribute to the
potential for accidents and failures in the
operational phase.
Systems engineering must continue
throughout the operational phases of a pro-
gram. Although the character of the top-
level activities change, there still is a need to
deal with program requirements and their
alteration. Some of the possible subjects are
the rate and nature of the flight program
buildup, working around performance
deficiencies or failures, and adjustments to
mission objectives. On the positive side, the
top-level systems engineering in the oper-
ational phase involves the incorporation of
new system capabilities and mission exten-
sions, including the development and control
of the associated program requirements.
Support to the activities just described is
accomplished by a systems engineering
group also operating at the highest level in
the program's organizational structure. This
group is the guardian and conscience of the
top-level program requirements but by no
means includes the total systems engineer-
ing effort. The group should be composed of
engineering personnel, each of whom has
considerable technical experience in one or
more of the applicable areas and possesses a
natural talent and desire to deal with all
aspects of the program. The individuals
should be selected so the group encompasses
as many of the technical, scientific and
programmatic disciplines involved in the
program as possible, but the group does not
have to be large. By selecting people with the
right backgrounds and talents, the work can
be done in part by obtaining information
from other elements of the program--in
particular, other systems engineering
groups.
HOW ARE TOP-LEVEL PROGRAM
REQUIREMENTS CONTROLLED?
Control of top-level program requirements is
extremely critical to program success. This is
not to say that such requirements cannot be
changed. Almost without exception changes
will occur, but they must be carefully
controlled by a well-defined process that es-
tablishes the change impact on the program,
particularly its objectives. This process also
must inform program participants inside
and outside the program organizational
structure, including those having responsi-
bilities or scrutiny from above.
The program director is the individual
who is personally responsible for the integri-
ty and control of the top-level program
requirements. As such, the program director
must assure that a Program Requirements
Document is produced during Phase A and
that it is properly updated immediately
following a change. This effort is supported
mainly by the program director's systems
engineering group described in previous sec-
tions. This group is responsible for analyzing
any proposed change that could potentially
impact the top-level program requirements.
-_._
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The analysis can be done by the group itself
or by support groups, including contractors.
The analysis must specifically include in
writing how the affected requirement(s)
would be changed and the determination of
other impacts such as cost or schedule, which
could be either positive or negative.
Change Control of Program
Requirements
Change proposals are brought before a
standing committee, usually called a change
board, selected by the program director.
There will be other change boards through-
out the program, but this one should deal
only with top-level program requirements.
Anyone who proposes a legitimate change in
the program requirements should be able to
come before this board. In general, individu-
als who have a significant input should also
be invited. The proposed change is usually
presented by its sponsor and is followed by a
presentation of the analysis of the systems
engineering group. Following discussion, the
program director makes the disposition,
which can include acceptance, rejection, or a
requirement for further analyses or informa-
tion. Following an acceptance, the Program
Requirements Document should be changed
immediately. Regardless of the nature of the
decision, the affected elements of the pro-
gram organization need to be informed im-
mediately. Affected elements outside the
program should also be informed in a timely
manner but only after an appropriate strate-
gy is developed.
One of the chief difficulties associated
with this change control activity is that
events that impact the top-level program re-
quirements can occur at any place, at any
time and at any level in the program, and
there is a natural tendency to try to fix a
problem at its source without passing on
information. Several things can be done to
alleviate this difficulty as it relates to the
activities of the top-level systems engineer-
ing group. Individuals in the group must
attend design reviews and other program
reviews associated with all the program ele-
ments. They must be able to have free infor-
mation exchange with other program and
project personnel and to accompany them on
visits to contractors when the occasion
demands. These activities are best accom-
plished if the group and its members operate
with a low profile. They should not give or
imply directions or conclusions in discus-
sions with program and project people. All
direction as a result of their work should
come from the program director. Naturally,
these individuals must be able to request
and analyze program documentation, but all
such activities should be done in a way to
maintain good rapport with other groups
working in the program.
TOP-LEVEL PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS IN
PREVIOUS PROGRAMS
In general, most of NASA's past major pro-
grams have successfully met their program
objectives and must have fulfilled their pro-
gram requirements. Some brief observations
of the results obtained during some of the
previous manned programs may provide use-
ful insight into future programs. Although
the very early programs were not explicitly
divided into program phases, in retrospect, it
is possible to discuss them within a phased
context.
The Mercury Program
The Mercury program objective was to place
a manned spacecraft in orbit around Earth
and return safely. In pre-Phase A, several
winged (lifting) configurations were studied
as well as the so-called "capsule." The cap-
sule was selected on the basis of greater
technical simplicity and limitations on
launch vehicle payload capability. In Phase
A, in addition to developing the spacecraft
systems specifications, safety requirements
were emphasized, including the proper posi-
tioning and support of the crew to handle
III
NAL MONOGRAPH SERIES: SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PAPERS
launch and reentry accelerations, which
were demonstrated on a centrifuge; the con-
cept of a system to escape from the launch
vehicle if necessary; and the layout of a
worldwide tracking and monitoring network.
In Phase B, a full-scale demonstration of the
reentry heat protection system was conduct-
ed, and the results produced minor design
changes. The concepts of flight control and
recovery were evolved, including a mission
control center and flight controller deploy-
ment to remote sites, worldwide communica-
tion for near real-time surveillance of the
missions, and recovery procedures involving
ship deployment.
The spacecraft configuration and specifi-
cations proved to be satisfactory although
considerable development problems were
encountered. The biggest systems engineer-
ing problem was associated with the lack of
appreciation of the difficulties in conducting
factory and preflight checkout. The checkout
required more or less continuous human
presence in the extremely confining interior
of the spacecraft, producing wire breakage
and other damage. These conditions were
severe enough to curtail the flight program,
although six manned flights were made,
building up to a duration of approximately
one day in orbit.
The Gemini Program
The pre-Phase A activity concentrated large-
ly on correcting some of the basic problems
encountered in Mercury, i.e., a Gemini
spacecraft design that had most of the equip-
ment outside the pressure vessel and was
also checkable from the outside, allowing a
relatively clear cockpit area. The spacecraft
was enlarged to provide for a two-man crew,
but the basic external configuration and heat
protection system of the Mercury spacecraft
was retained.
Most of the Phase A activity involved
defining the mission objectives, in support of
Apollo, and the related program require-
ments associated with rendezvous and long
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duration flight, e.g., the Atlas-Agena target
vehicle, orbit maneuvering system, rendez-
vous radar, fuel cells, and the cryogenic
storage of hydrogen and oxygen in a super-
critical state. Again, considerable develop-
ment problems emerged, largely associated
with the newer systems, such as ablative
thrusters and fuel cells. Problems were also
encountered in the flight program. The ini-
tial rendezvous exercise revealed inadequate
attention to mission design, which was later
corrected, and several classes of rendezvous
were successfully demonstrated. The extra-
vehicular activities revealed deficiencies in
training, and neutral buoyancy simulation
was introduced late in the program.
One significant systems engineering
achievement emphasized the checkout
systems and checkout procedures, and the
delivery of flight ready spacecraft. To gain
confidence, many of the checkout personnel
at the Cape were sent on temporary duty
(TDY) to the factory to participate in the
factory checkout of the early spacecraft. This
approach allowed the ten manned flights to
take place on about two-month cycles and
contributed immensely to the on-time
launches required for rendezvous.
The Apollo Program
The Apollo Program was characterized by a
disjointed definition program. Because of the
obvious schedule pressures, certain contracts
involving Phase B-type effort were let before
either the mission design or the lunar
landing mode had been selected. For exam-
ple, the command and service module con-
tract was awarded while questions about the
use of Earth orbit rendezvous, lunar orbit
rendezvous, and the so-called direct ascent
were still being debated. Sufficient pre-
Phase A effort was completed to enable a
decision to go with the lunar orbit rendez-
vous route in the spring of 1962, but the
Phase A work on the lunar module, even
when accomplished in-house on a highly ac-
celerated schedule, did not allow the lunar
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module contractor to be selected until nearly
a year after the selection of the command
and service module contractor. This situa-
tion proved to be very distracting to the
latter and resulted in major inefficiencies in
the contracted effort caused by premature
work force buildup.
What saved the situation was the main-
tenance of simple interfaces between the two
spacecraft. In fact, not much more than a
docking interface existed; however, there
was also an important structural interface
recalling that service module propulsion was
used to place the docked configuration in
lunar orbit. No support was required be-
tween the two spacecraft except status moni-
toring, and no commonality of systems was
specified, although by some rationales, this
approach appears inefficient. The simple
system organizational and programmatic
interfaces obtained greatly benefited the
program. It was also the approach taken in
connection with other elements of Apollo.
The operational phase of the Apollo pro-
gram provides good illustrations of systems
capability extension and mission extensions.
The major extensions to the lunar surface
stay-time of the lunar module is an example.
The decision to accomplish this was made
about the time of the first lunar landing, and
a Headquarters systems engineering group
provided the impetus for the validation. An-
other capability extension was the addition
of the lunar rover contract, awarded about
six years after the Apollo start but before the
first lunar landing. Both these added capa-
bilities greatly enhanced the lunar surface
science and exploration aspects of the Apollo
program.
The Skylab Program
The definition activities of the program that
ultimately became Skylab proceeded in what
must be described as a highly confused state;
most of the program objectives and user-
oriented program requirements, however,
remained stable for the entire duration of the
program. The program first known as Apollo
Applications started out as a series of single-
mission flights involving a larger number of
scientific and technical experiments. This
program concept was the basis for approval
in the President's budget for FY 1968. About
the same time, a command decision was
made to incorporate these experiments in a
concept known as the "wet workshop," in
which a spent upper stage of the Saturn V
would be left in orbit, purged, occupied and
outfitted to perform the experiments. Many
believed the concept could not work, but the
program proceeded to preliminary design
and, in many cases, detailed design. In the
spring of 1969, a decision was made to go to a
"dry workshop" wherein all the flight hard-
ware elements would be assembled and
checked out on the ground and launched us-
ing the first two stages of the Saturn V as the"
launch vehicle. It took another four years of
design and development to bring the pro-
gram to flight readiness. The flight program
was quite successful in the accomplishment
of the many experiments. The data obtained
from a large solar telescope, for example, the
Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM), was regard-
ed as outstanding by the scientists involved.
This capability was included in the earliest
program requirements.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has endeavored to highlight the
importance of generating top-level program
requirements at an early stage in the pro-
gram evolution or Phase A definition phase.
These requirements should include all the
factors involved in meeting the program-
objective(s) and should be stated with clarity
so a determination can be made as to wheth-
er they can or are being met. Depending on
the nature of the program, these require-
ments can relate to uses of a capability, a
mission objective or other factors, including
a simple hardware demonstration such as a
test of a new instrument. It is critical to
understand whether specific performance
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requirements are to be met or only a demon-
stration of capability is entailed, for the
latter provides more flexibility for program
adjustments.
The establishment of program require-
ments usually requires input and involve-
ment of people both inside and outside of the
program organization. Determination of just
what disciplines are involved is important,
particularly for the users and operators.
Validation of the top-level program
requirements is a systems engineering func-
tion. At the outset, the systems engineering
organization works with entities responsible
for generating the requirements in an
iterative process to assure their validity.
This activity continues throughout the life of
the program because of unforeseen events
that impact the program effort. At times,
this will necessitate changes to top-level
program requirements. Changes should be
under formal change control, and the sys-
tems engineering organization operating at
the top of the program organization struc-
ture should be responsible for the validation
: effort. Systems engineering is a program-
distributed activity that allows the top-level
systems engineering organization to be rela-
tively small because it depends on others for
most of the required analysis. It should oper-
ate with a low profile.
Past programs serve to illustrate the
range of program requirements consider-
ations and the associated systems engineer-
ing effort. In the early manned programs,
safety was a dominant consideration. Exper-
ience in these programs showed that
preflight checkout is an important consider-
ation, as is mission design, training, and
simulation, all of which can impact the hard-
ware design.
The top-level program requirements and
the associated systems engineering activi-
ties should obtain and maintain simple
interfaces between program elements, even
though this produces some apparent pro-
gram inefficiency. At least one past program,
Skylab, has shown that top-level program
requirements can be maintained even when
considerable fluxing occurs with regard to
the hardware and mission design.
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